Mistakes are inevitable in medicine. To learn how medical mistakes relate to subsequent changes in practice, we surveyed 254 internal medicine house officers. One hundred and fourteen house officers (45%) completed an anonymous questionnaire describing their most significant mistake and their response to it. Mistakes included errors in diagnosis (33%), prescribing (29%), evaluation (21%), and communication (5%) and procedural complications (11%). Patients had serious adverse outcomes in 90% of the cases, including death in 31% of cases. Only 54% of house officers discussed the mistake with their attending physicians, and only 24% told the patients or families. House officers who accepted responsibility for the mistake and discussed it were more likely to report constructive changes in practice. Residents were less likely to make constructive changes if they attributed the mistake to job overload. They were more likely to report defensive changes if they felt the institution was judgmental. Decreasing the work load and closer supervision may help prevent mistakes. To promote learning, faculty should encourage house officers to accept responsibility and to discuss their mistakes. "The most fruitful lesson is the conquest of one's own error. Whoever refuses to admit error may be a great scholar but he is not a great learner. Whoever is ashamed of error will struggle against recognizing and admitting it, which means that he struggles against his greatest inward gain."
Goethe, Maxims and Reflections
Mistakes are inevitable in the practice of medicine because of the complexity of medical knowledge, the uncertainty of clinical predictions, time pressures, and the need to make decisions despite limited or uncertain knowledge. Mistakes may be particularly distressing for physicians in training because they are assuming new clinical skills and responsibilities. Mistakes can be powerful formative experiences, beneficial in some cases, harmful in others. Ideally, mistakes would be used by medical educators as teaching tools. However, while mistakes in medical practice have been discussed in essays, [1] [2] [3] [4] anthropologic studies, [5] [6] [7] and anecdotal accounts, 8 9 little is known about how house officers can learn better from their mistakes.
We examined mistakes reported by house officers at three academic internal medicine training programs to address the following questions: What types of mistakes did they make? What did house officers perceive were the causes of their mistakes? How did house officers and institutions respond to mistakes? What predicted whether house officers learned from their mistakes?
SUBJECTS AND METHODS

Subjects
In May 1989 we mailed a questionnaire to 254 house officers in three internal medicine training programs associated with medical schools. Programs were located at large (>500 beds) academic tertiary care hospitals.
Procedures
Questionnaires were filled out anonymously to assure confidentiality. House officers were asked to return a postcard indicating either that they had mailed the completed questionnaire or that they did not wish to participate in the study. If the postcard was not returned, house officers received two additional mailings and a personal reminder from one of the authors. Approval for the study was obtained from institutional review boards at all three institutions.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire was developed after a review of the literature 7 10-19 and two stages of pretesting. Subjects were asked to describe their most significant medical mistake in the last year, their response to it, and the events that followed. A mistake was defined as an act or omission for which the house officer felt responsible that had serious or potentially serious consequences for the patient and that would have been judged wrong by knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred.
Respondents first wrote a paragraph about the mistake and then answered questions about the age and prognosis of the affected patient, adverse patient outcomes, and perceived causes of the mistake.
In describing responses to the mistake, house officers answered questions about the degree to which they accepted responsibility for the mistake, their emotional response to the mistake, discussions about the mistake with others, the institutional response to the mistake, and changes in practice due to making the mistake.
Questions used four-point Likert-type and categorical response formats. Respondents were also encouraged to write comments at the end of the questionnaire.
Scales
We grouped items on the questionnaire into scales representing meaningful concepts on the basis of factor analysis and consensus of the authors' judgment. Each scale score was created by summing the responses to the items it included.
Causes of the mistake were described by three scales: inexperience (three items), job overload (two items), and case complexity (four items). Responsibility for the mistake was measured with three items from the "accepting responsibility" subscale of the Ways of Coping Scale developed by Folkman and Lazarus. 20 Emotional distress in response to the mistake was measured with four items. The extent to which the institutional response was judgmental was measured with two items. The extent of discussion was measured by summing affirmative responses to items that asked whether the physician discussed the mistake with the supervising attending physician, another medical person, the patient or family, or at a conference.
Learning from the mistake was measured by two scales that asked house officers how they changed their practices due to the mistake. A scale of constructive changes in practice contained nine items. A scale of defensive changes contained two items. It should be noted that constructive and defensive changes measure separate concepts rather than polar opposites of the same scale. Therefore, a house officer might report both constructive and defensive changes in practice after making a mistake.
Means, SDs, and internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach's α) for each of these scales are shown in table 1. Relatively large SDs for the overload, judgmental, and defensive scales reflect skewed score distributions. The non-normal distributions make the α coefficient difficult to interpret. To facilitate comparison of the different scale scores, scores were transformed linearly to a scale of 0 through 100, with 0 indicating the lowest and 100 indicating the highest possible score.
Analysis
Analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, twosample t tests and one-way analyses of variance were used to test the relationship between the dependent variables (constructive change and defensive change) and categorical independent variables (house officer gender and year of residency training; institution and setting of the mistake; patient age group, previous functioning, and life expectancy; whether or not there was a serious outcome; and extent of discussion). Simple correlations were used to evaluate the relationship between the dependent variables and continuous independent variables (scales for causes of the mistake, accepting responsibility for the mistake, and institutional response to the mistake).
In the second stage, variables that had been found to be related to the dependent variables at p<0.15 were included in two multiple linear regression equations to test their independent relationship to (1) constructive changes in practice and (2) defensive changes in practice.
RESULTS
Characteristics of respondents
Of the 254 residents surveyed, 114 (45%) responded by reporting a mistake and completing the questionnaire. An additional 56 residents (22%) returned a postcard acknowledging receipt but declining to complete the questionnaire. The remaining 33% did not respond.
Our study group comprised the 114 respondents who completed the questionnaire. Because the results did not differ by site, we present only aggregated results. 33% of the subjects were women. 36% of the respondents were interns, 32% were junior residents, and 32% were senior residents. The distributions of gender and year of training were similar among respondents and non-respondents. The most frequently reported type of mistake was a missed diagnosis (33%). In one typical case, a house officer failed to recognize congestive heart failure in a patient with human immunodeficiency virus disease with severe dyspnea. Errors in evaluation and treatment were reported in 21% of cases. For example, one resident noted but failed to treat profound hypoglycemia in a patient with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome admitted with neutropenia and presumed sepsis. The patient had a seizure and died soon thereafter.
House officers reported errors in prescribing and dosing of drugs in 29% of cases. One resident missed an intern's drug dosing error in an elderly woman with congestive heart failure who was well known to him from previous admissions. "I approved the intern's admission orders without noting a significant error," in which an 80 mg dose of a cardiac medication was transcribed as 180 mg. The patient was found dead 2 hours after her first dose.
Errors ascribed to faulty communication were described in 5% of cases. In one such case, a resident accepted misinformation from the emergency department physician that a patient being admitted was not to be resuscitated. "I subsequently found out from the patient's family and personal physician that the patient was not a 'no code.' At that point in time the patient had not been treated aggressively and died 24 hours later."
Examples of procedural complications, described in 11% of cases, and other types of mistakes are given in table 2; a brief summary of all of the mistakes is presented in table 3.
Outcomes of mistakes
In response to the question "What adverse effects did the mistake have for the patient?", 90% of residents reported that patients had significant adverse outcomes following mistakes. These included physical discomfort (32%), emotional distress (27%), additional therapy (25%), additional procedure (13%), prolonged hospital stay (24%), and death (31%). Mistakes often had multiple adverse outcomes. For 10% of patients, no adverse outcome was attributed to the mistake. A brief summary of the reported outcomes of the mistakes is included in table 3.
Causes of mistakes
The causes of mistakes reported by house officers varied (table  4) . House officers usually attributed mistakes to more than one cause: 54% reported that mistakes were caused in part because they did not know information they should have known (e.g. being unaware of the significance of a prolonged episode of ventricular tachycardia); 51% reported "too many other tasks" (e.g. one resident neglected to continue to administer a required medication, being "too busy with other sick patients and supervising interns and students"); 41% reported fatigue (e.g. after inadvertently ordering potassium replacement as a bolus, one resident commented, "It was 3 am and I'm not sure I was completely awake").
Circumstances of mistakes
The mistakes occurred during medical school in 3% of cases, during the first year of residency in 53% of cases, during the second year of residency in 36% of cases, and during the third year of residency in 9% of cases. The mistakes happened with inpatients in 77% of cases, emergency department patients in 14% of cases, and outpatients in 9% of cases. The patients involved in the mistakes were less than 18 years old in 1% of cases, 18-64 years in 60% of cases, and 65 years or older in 39% of cases. House officers estimated the life expectancy of patients to be less than 1 month in 10% of the cases, 1-6 months in 22% of the cases, 6-12 months in 18% of the cases, and greater than 12 months in 50% of the cases.
House officers' responses to mistakes House officers reported discussing the mistake with the supervising attending physician in only 54% of cases. However, 88% of house officers discussed the mistake with another physician who was not in a supervisory capacity. House officers discussed the mistake with the patient or patient's family in only 24% of cases; 58% of house officers reported talking to a non-medical person about the mistake. Only 5% of house officers did not tell anyone about the mistake. On a scale ranging from 0 to 100 for extent of discussion, the mean score was 52.5 (SD 22.8). On average, house officers discussed the mistake with two of the following: their supervising attending physician, another medical person, the patient or family, or at a conference. Most house officers were willing to accept responsibility for their mistakes. Subjects' responses included "promising to do things differently the next time" in 76% of cases, "criticizing or lecturing oneself " in 62% of cases, and "apologizing or doing something to make up" in 21% of cases. On a scale ranging from 0 to 100 for accepting responsibility, the mean score was 54.5 (SD 22.3).
House officers experienced emotional distress in reaction to the mistakes. After a fatal mistake involving a young patient, one house officer wrote: "This event has been the greatest challenge to me in my training." They felt remorseful in 81% of cases, angry at themselves in 79% of cases, guilty in 72% of cases, and inadequate in 60% of cases. On a scale that ranged from 0 to 100, the mean level of distress was 71.3 (SD 23.7). The correlation between distress and accepting responsibility was 0.58 (p<0.0001). 28% of house officers feared negative repercussions from the mistake.
A few house officers reported persistently negative psychological impact of mistakes. After a mistake caused the death of a patient, one house officer commented, "This case has made me very nervous about clinical medicine. I worry now about all febrile patients since they may be on the verge of sepsis." For another house officer, a missed diagnosis made him reject a career in subspecialties that involve "a lot of data collection and uncertainty."
Institutional responses to mistakes
Mistakes were discussed in attending rounds in 57% of cases and at the morning report or morbidity and mortality conference in 31% of cases. However, house officers stated that, in about half of these conferences (48%), "the tough issues were not addressed." One house officer believed "the key issues were ignored by the morbidity and mortality committee, i.e. being overworked, having too many patients to care for at one time. " House officers felt that the hospital atmosphere inhibited them from talking about the mistakes in 27% of cases and that the administration was judgmental about the mistakes in 20%. One house officer felt that public discussion is counterproductive: "Training programs do not sympathize or help one learn from one's mistakes. Instead, the administration is usually critical and often ostracizes the individual." In contrast, although another house officer was initially reluctant, she found discussing her mistake to be a positive experience: "Presenting this case at intern's report was difficult-I felt under a lot of scrutiny from my peers. In the end, I felt as though I had gotten more respect from presenting this kind of case rather than one where I had made a great diagnosis."
Changes in practice
Almost all residents (98%) reported some change in practice in response to their mistakes. The most frequently reported changes were paying more attention to detail (82%), confirming clinical data personally (72%), and seeking advice (62%). Most residents (98%) reported at least one constructive change. Only 18% reported one or more defensive changes. A summary of constructive and defensive changes reported by house officers is shown in table 5. In addition, 26% of respondents described ordering more tests as a result of their mistakes. In review, the authors believe that ordering more tests might have prevented the mistake in most cases. Thus, we did not group this item with defensive changes.
Factors relating to reported changes in practice
We examined how predictor variables-physician characteristics, patient characteristics, type and seriousness of the mistake, causes of the mistake, and responses to the mistake by the physician and the institution-were related to reported constructive and defensive changes in practice. In univariate analysis, constructive changes in practice were significantly associated (p<0.05) with female gender, serious outcome, inexperience, or case complexity as causes of the mistake, accepting responsibility for the mistake, and extent of discussion of the mistake. Defensive changes in practice were significantly associated with house officers' perceptions of job overload as a cause of the mistake and perceptions that the institution responded judgmentally. Changes in practice were not significantly related to age, functional level, or prognosis or to physician year of training or institution.
In multivariate analysis, reported constructive changes in practice were associated with several independent predictors (table 6). Residents were more likely to report constructive changes if the mistake was caused by faulty judgment in a complex case or by inexperience, but they were less likely to do so if they perceived that the mistake was caused by job overload. Physicians who responded to the mistake with greater acceptance of responsibility and more discussion were also more likely to report constructive changes. The independent variables shown in table 6 were associated with 44% of the variance in constructive changes. Constructive change is reported on a scale of 0 to 100, with 33 equivalent to an average response of "disagree somewhat" and 67 equivalent to an average response of "agree somewhat." The independent effect of a predictor variable on constructive change can be calculated by multiplying the β coefficient by the difference in score or category for that predictor variable, as noted in table 6.
Defensive changes in practice were more likely if there was a judgmental institutional response to the mistake (β=0.37, p<0.001). In multivariate analysis, the model was associated with 29% of the variance in defensive changes. However, the small number of respondents reporting defensive changes gave this analysis relatively little power to detect significant predictors.
COMMENT
Mistakes are inevitable in clinical medicine, given its inherent uncertainty and complexity and the need to make decisions despite limited information. Because house officers are taking on new clinical responsibilities, they may be particularly likely to make mistakes.
This study suggests several ways to help residents learn from their mistakes and institute constructive changes in practice. First, house officers should be encouraged to accept responsibility for their mistakes. In our study, residents who reported accepting responsibility reported constructive changes in practice more often than residents who did not accept responsibility. However, accepting responsibility for mistakes was also strongly associated with emotional distress. For example, one resident described persistent feelings of guilt and shame after inappropriate management of a diabetic foot ulcer led to an amputation. Thus, supervising physicians who encourage house officers to accept responsibility for their mistakes need to respond sensitively to the distress those house officers may experience.
Second, house officers should be encouraged to discuss their mistakes with attending physicians. While house officers candidly described their mistakes in the questionnaire, barely half had told their attending physicians about them, although the attending physician is legally and ethically responsible for patient care. Several house officers expressed the desire for helpful discussion. One resident wanted more discussion so that "some of the unsaid horrors of our experiences can be discussed and dealt with." Another wrote, "I was very disturbed that there was never really an opportunity to discuss the mistake . . . I was also very frightened by the impact that carelessness or ignorance on my part could have on someone else's life." In training programs, mistakes are traditionally discussed at conferences and rounds. In this study, however, when their mistakes had been discussed in a conference, half of the house officers said that the "tough issues were not addressed." In non-medical specialties, avoidance of important issues may be a common response to mistakes. For example, in psychiatry, suicide review conferences often transform "negative evidence into a positive display of an attending's skill." 21 In surgery, a morbidity and mortality conference consists of "ceremonial apologies" by attending physicians. 6 The limited role of residents in these proceedings may preclude useful discussion. Future studies should explore why house officers are reluctant to tell their supervisors about their mistakes and how to encourage fruitful discussion.
Because mistakes may have harmful consequences for patients, it is important to try to reduce their frequency and severity. Our findings regarding the reported causes of mistakes suggest specific strategies for preventing mistakes. First, more active supervision may prevent some mistakes or mitigate their adverse effects. Senior physicians should be more available for critical decisions about patient care, especially in complex cases that require more mature clinical judgment. One officer complained, "As an intern, I couldn'tand didn't-know enough to manage the case." Another speculated, "If I had had more attending support all along with this patient, the diagnosis would have been made much sooner and the patient might have survived." Attention must be given to house officer work load. McCue 22 has suggested that sleep deprivation during training may teach house officers to tolerate and rationalize unnecessary errors. In our study, house officers reported that job overload played a part in 65% of mistakes. Moreover, house officers who reported being fatigued or having too many tasks to perform were less likely to seek information following a mistake. Such information seeking might help prevent future mistakes. 23 Disclosure of mistakes to patients or their families is a difficult issue. In our study, such disclosure was reported by fewer than one quarter of house officers. This finding is consistent with reports suggesting that physicians are reluctant to tell patients about mistakes. 5 24 25 Legal and ethical experts, however, suggest that a patient generally should be told about a mistake. 4 26-28 Disclosure of a mistake may also foster learning by compelling the physician to acknowledge it truthfully. Indeed, our study suggests that accepting responsibility may precede learning from a mistake. Finally, Hilfiker 8 argues that disclosing a mistake to the patient may be the only way for the physician to achieve a sense of absolution. However, telling patients about mistakes may be difficult 0.44 *NS=not significant. †The following scale was used for causes of the mistake, judgmental institutional response, and constructive change; 0, disagree strongly; 33, disagree somewhat; 67, agree somewhat; and 100, agree strongly. ‡The following scale was used for accepting responsibility: 0, not at all; 33, somewhat; 67, quite a bit; and 100, a great deal. §The following scale was used for the extent of discussion (with the supervising attending physician, another medical person, the patient or family, and/or at a conference): 0, none of these; 25, one of these; 50, two of these; 75, three of these; and 100, all four of these.
because there are no guidelines about how to do so. One way might be for the attending physician and house officer to inform the patient of the mistake together. Such joint discussions might benefit house officers by providing emotional support and role modeling.
Our findings may be limited in several important ways. First, since accounts of mistakes and changes in practice were anonymous, we have no external confirmation of the data. Some residents may have exaggerated the impact of their mistakes. Many patients were terminally ill and medically unstable, and the mistakes might not have caused the adverse outcomes. Second, the limited response rate, the relatively small sample size, and the sample of internal medicine residents at large teaching hospitals limit the generalizability of our findings. It is likely that non-respondents felt more defensive than respondents. If so, the actual severity of outcomes might be worse than we reported, and the proportion of mistakes that are discussed might be less than our findings indicate. Finally, some associations we found may be due to unmeasured confounding variables rather than cause-and-effect relationships. For example, unmeasured personality characteristics of house officers might cause them both to discuss mistakes with others and to make constructive changes in practice.
Medical training and patient care will benefit from an environment that allows house officers to learn constructively from their mistakes. Supervising physicians need to encourage house officers to accept responsibility for their mistakes and need to provide opportunities for discussing mistakes. Directors of training programs should resolve problems in staffing and scheduling that may contribute to mistakes and impede learning. Physicians can learn from their mistakes even as they strive to minimize their occurrence. 
NOW THE WRONG QUESTION?
No one wants to make mistakes, least of all doctors whose mistakes may kill their patients. The classic paper by Wu et al 1 which is republished here shocked the medical establishment in 1991 by revealing how many doctors in training (interns and residents) were aware of having made serious mistakes in their first few years of hospital practice. Some of these probably led to the death of patients. The causes of the mistakes were often multiple and included lack of knowledge or experience, failure of supervision, faulty or delayed decision making, job overload, and fatigue.
Has anything changed in the decade or more since that paper was published? The study recommended that the underlying causes of error should be addressed: inexperienced trainees should be actively supervised by their seniors (especially in complex cases) and job overload should be tackled. The lot of the junior doctor has certainly changed. In Europe there has been a reduction in junior doctors' hours of working and these will be further reduced with the European Working Time Directive. In the USA the US Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education has limited the hours of work for junior doctors to 80 per week from July 2003. In the UK this is 56 hours by 2004, reducing further by 2009. Doctors are now transferring to shift systems for emergency on call work, thereby reducing the actual length of time on call. This may reduce error by reducing sleep deprivation but, against this, it may increase the frequency of handovers, a risky process unless well managed. There tends to be more supervision by seniors or other members of the multidisciplinary team, and more clearly defined roles and levels of responsibility-as has been identified by successive reports of the National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths (CEPOD) in the UK. 2 Doctors do not now work in isolation but as members of teams which are usually multiprofessional. In health care around the world there is a growing awareness of errors occurring, with an increase in efforts to assess their causes and improve patient safety. Although not universal, junior doctors are beginning to be taught to recognise when errors or "near misses" occur. They are learning what to do when they occur and how they may be prevented from happening again. Appraisal and assessments are recognised as an integral part of training and provide the opportunity to ensure that responsibility is tailored to the competence of the trainee.
In the paper by Wu et al, 1 only half of the junior doctors who admitted to being responsible for an error told a senior colleague and a mere quarter told either the patient or the patient's family. The doctor/patient relationship and the way that patients interact with the healthcare system has changed in the past decade. Previously, the culture of "the doctor knows best" predominated. Now doctors are encouraged to discuss diagnoses and treatments with patients and to empower the patient to take part in the decision making process. Patients are now better informed and are more likely to question their treatment and the outcomes-good or badwith their doctor. If errors come to light, should the patient be told and do they want to be told? Whitman et al 3 concluded that patients want to be told about adverse events even if minor, while Lo 4 argued that patients need only be informed of major events. All patients are individuals and different. Patients are part of the system and therefore also have responsibilities. 5 It no longer seems justifiable to keep patients in the dark about the risks and alternatives to interventions, nor about any adverse events or complications as they arise.
The young doctors in the study were willing to blame themselves for their mistakes, and most responded by promising to do things differently in future, and criticising or lecturing themselves. They changed their own personal practice by increased information seeking and increased vigilance. But medicine is complex and riddled with uncertainties. Medical error rates are unlikely to reduce as a result of individuals resolving to be more careful in the future. Lessons from aviation suggest that confidential "no blame" reporting is more effective in ensuring that lessons are learnt not just by the individual but by the organisation. Such a system has led to an increase in reported errors, but a decrease in their seriousness. 6 In practice, are all medical errors reported? If the levels of errors from anonymous surveys are to be believed, then obviously not. Therefore what is stopping house officers from reporting their errors? Mostly it is a defence against being seen as a doctor who has made an error-a "bad" doctor-which may blight their careers, or to a more serious fear of being sued by the patient or being investigated by the General Medical Council and possibly even being suspended.
In the past the focus has been on blaming the individual who made the mistake. Doctors are now part of multiprofessional teams that work within an institutional environment. Institutional organisation has a large role to play as the error may be due to the system and not the individual. It is usually wrong to blame the individual as the system should make it easy for the right action and difficult for the wrong action to occur. The junior doctor may just be at the end of the line following a cascade of minor errors within the system leading to a major error. If so, the major error could have been prevented at any of the minor stages. The system and the individual cannot be viewed separately. Improvements in the system have to be matched by awareness in the individual. This has been recognised in other industries such as the airline and the nuclear industries. They have instituted risk assessment programmes to try and identify minor problems before they escalate into a major catastrophe. Barach and Small have shown how lessons learnt in these non-medical industries can be applied to the design of safety systems in health care. 7 These lessons are now being adopted by the health service. St George's Hospital in London has established a course to train staff to recognise the early indicators that may lead to an error. 8 Risk management is a responsibility of all members of the team.
We are moving from a culture of "naming, blaming and shaming" to one of encouraging reporting and consequently improving the service. The individual, especially at house officer level, should not necessarily be seen as the guilty party, yet we still see cases where manslaughter charges are brought against individual junior doctors for errors that have unfortunately led to death. The mistake should be seen as one that got through the system-a system error, not an individual's error alone. It is therefore the system that needs changing. The responsibility lies with both clinicians and managers to learn from the error, not just the individual.
The paper by Wu and colleagues asked whether house officers learnt from their mistakes. Now it sounds like the wrong question. What is the point of only individual junior doctors learning from their own mistakes? The organisation also needs to learn, to disseminate that learning, and to make sure the lessons are learnt not just for the present but also for the future. Doctors will continue to fail to report errors while there is a culture of blame. Instead, we need a culture-individually and institutionally-of identification and reporting of errors leading to correction, learning, and improvement in the provision of health care. We should not be asking whether house officers learn from their mistakes, but whether the health service learns from the mistakes that its systems allow to happen, and whether the system can be changed for the benefit of patients and those members of staff working within the organisation. Leadership is essential to making the changes happen and keeping the organisation focused. 9 10 Education and training is the key to success, both at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. It has been shown that, if education and training is aimed at specific targets with good data, standardised tools and methods, then this leads to greater patient safety. 11 12 I R Hastie, E Paice London Postgraduate Medical and Dental Education, 20 Guilford Street, London WC1N 1DZ, UK; ihastie@londondeanery.ac.uk
